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The purpose of this study is to contribute to economic growth theory by introducing Cournot 
competition into the Solow-Uzawa neoclassical growth model with Zhang’s concept of disposable 
income and utility function. The Solow-Uzawa two-sector growth model deals with economic growth 
with two sectors with all the markets perfectly competitive. The final goods sector in this study is the 
same as that in the Solow model with perfect competition. The consumer goods sector is composed 
of two firms and characterized by Cournot competition. All the input factors are traded in perfectly 
competitive markets. The duopoly’s product is solely consumed by consumers. Perfectly competitive 
firms earn zero profit, while duopolists earn positive profits. This study assumes that the population 
shares the profits equally. First, we built the dynamic model. Afterward, we found a computational 
procedure to describe the time-dependent path of the economy and conducted comparative 
dynamic analyses of some parameters. Finally, we compared the economic performances of the 
model with Cournot competition and the perfectly competitive model. 
 
Keywords: Cournot game, perfect competition, Nash equilibrium, Solow model, Uzawa model. 
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Highlights 
 
 Contribution to economic growth theory by introducing Cournot competition into the Solow-
Uzawa neoclassical growth model. 
 Comparison of economic performances between the model with Cournot competition and the 
perfectly competitive model. 
 Integration of neoclassical and new growth theory. 
 
Resumen 
El propósito de este estudio es contribuir a la teoría del crecimiento económico por medio de la 
introducción de la competencia de Cournot en el modelo neoclásico del crecimiento económico de 
Solow-Uzawa con el concepto de ingreso disponible y la función de utilidad de Zhang. El modelo de 
crecimiento de dos sectores de Solow-Uzawa maneja el crecimiento económico con dos sectores con 
todos los mercados perfectamente competitivos. En este trabajo, el sector de bienes finales es el 
mismo que en el modelo de Solow con competencia perfecta. El sector de bienes de consumo está 
compuesto por dos firmas y se caracteriza por la competencia de Cournot. Todos los factores de 
entrada se intercambian en mercados perfectamente competitivos. Solo los consumidores consumen 
el producto del duopolio. Las firmas perfectamente competitivas tienen una ganancia igual a cero, 
mientras que las duopolistas tienen ganancias positivas. En este estudio se asume que la población 
comparte las ganancias de forma equitativa. Primero, construimos un modelo dinámico. Después, 
encontramos un procedimiento computacional para describir el movimiento de la economía 
dependiendo del tiempo y realizamos análisis dinámicos comparativos de algunos parámetros. 
Finalmente, comparamos los desempeños económicos del modelo con competencia de Cournot y el 
modelo perfectamente competitivo. 
 
Palabras clave: juego de Cournot, competencia perfecta, equilibrio de Nash, modelo de Solow, 
modelo de Uzawa. 
 




 Contribución a teoría del crecimiento económico por medio de la introducción de la competencia 
de Cournot en el modelo neoclásico del crecimiento económico de Solow-Uzawa. 
 Comparación de los desempeños económicos del modelo con competencia de Cournot y el 
modelo perfectamente competitivo. 





The objective of this paper is to introduce imperfect competition (Cournot game) of market structure, 
which has been well examined in industrial economics, into neoclassical growth theory with an 
alternative approach to the saving behavior of households. Neoclassical growth theory is especially 
concerned with the interdependence between wealth accumulation and production under simplified 
market structures (Thompson, 2020). The complexity of market structure in the literature has been 
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rapidly increasing in recent decades (Carlin, 2009). Such structure can be, for instance, monopoly, 
imperfect competition, oligopoly, and perfect competition. These markets co-exist in contemporary 
economies (de Frutos Cachorro et al., 2007). In microeconomic theory, efficiencies and the 
equilibrium of different market structures have been examined under several economic institutions 
(Nikaido, 1975; Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Brakman & Heijdra, 2004; Behrens & Murata, 2007; Parenti 
et al., 2017). However, almost all these studies are limited to a partial analytical framework. A few 
studies have attempted to introduce, for instance, oligopoly and monopoly into economic growth 
theory with endogenous physical capital. As a proper analysis of firms’ behavior in an economic 
system needs game theory in a general equilibrium framework, integrating some games with 
economic growth theory of endogenous capital accumulation is a challenging issue. This study 
contributes to economic growth theory by developing a neoclassical growth model with the co-
existence of Cournot competition and perfect competition in a general equilibrium framework. It also 
contributes to modelling the complexity of economic growth and the development of different types 
of market structures with a microeconomic foundation. In this paper, a few well-established 
economic theories in the literature of economics are integrated within a compact framework. The 
model is framed by the Solow-Uzawa two-sector growth model (Solow, 1956; Uzawa, 1961; Azariadis, 
1993). We consider a case in which the consumer goods sector in the Uzawa two-sector model is 
characterized by Cournot competition, while the capital goods sector is characterized by perfect 
competition.  
 
Cournot (1801–1877) proposed the theory of Cournot competition in 1838 when he examined a 
market dominated by duopoly. He constructed profit and best response functions for each firm for a 
given exogenous output level of the other firm. An equilibrium is identified where these best 
response functions intersect. The Cournot model has now become a standard model to analyze 
market structure in microeconomics. This study introduces the aforementioned market structure into 
neoclassical growth theory with wealth/capital accumulation. We considered an industrial market 
characterized by Cournot duopoly that supplies a homogenous product. Price is a known function of 
total output of each duopolist. Each duopolist takes the output of the other as given when it 
maximizes its profit. Each duopolist’s cost function is assumed to be common knowledge. The cost 
functions and production functions of each firm are different. The market price is determined when 
the demand is equal to the total quantity supplied by the duopoly. Each duopolist considers the 
quantity supplied by the other as given, evaluates its residual demand, and then behaves as a 
monopoly.  
 
The macro framework of this study is founded on the Solow-Uzawa neoclassical model. The 
mechanism of economic growth is wealth accumulation. Most formal models in the literature of 
neoclassical growth economic theory with endogenous wealth accumulation are developed for 
economies with perfectly competitive markets (Burmeister & Dobell 1970; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 
1995; Ben-David & Loewy, 2003; Zhang, 2008). In the last four decades, the so-called new economic 
theory has become the main approach to integrate industrial and managerial economics with 
traditional macroeconomics. The new theory attempts to integrate imperfect and perfect 
competition within a compact analytical framework (Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1979; Romer, 
1990; Benassy, 1996; van de Klundert & Smulders, 1997; D’Aspremont et al., 2007; Denicolo & 
Zanchettin, 2010; Nocco et al., 2017). Nevertheless, most of these studies do not include proper 
mechanisms of physical capital and wealth accumulation as important growth factors. Zhang (2018, 
2020) contributed to the literature of growth theory by synthesizing (some ideas in) new growth 
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theory and neoclassical growth theory within a compact framework. Nevertheless, almost all formal 
models in new growth theory do not deal with issues related to the integration of Cournot 
competition theory and formal growth theory. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we build a growth model of perfect and 
Cournot competition with endogenous wealth accumulation. In Section 3, we study analytical 
properties of the economic system and identify the existence of a point of equilibrium. In Section 4, 
we carry out a comparative static analysis of a few parameters. Finally, in Section 5, we draw the 
conclusions of this study. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The two-sector growth model with perfect and Cournot competition  
 
This study integrates Cournot competition into the Solow-Uzawa neoclassical growth model with 
Zhang’s concept of disposable income and utility function. For the sake of simplicity, we deal with a 
duopoly here. The model can be generalized in a straightforward manner in case of any number of 
firms in Cournot competition. Most aspects of the model are basically the same as those in the Solow-
Uzawa two-sector growth model, except for the modelling of household behavior and duopoly 
behavior. The economy supplies final goods and products of the duopoly. The final goods sector is 
perfectly competitive and produces capital goods as in the Solow model. Capital goods are invested 
and consumed. The final goods sector is the same as the one in the Solow model. We follow the 
Uzawa two-sector model regarding the modelling of the economic structure. In the Uzawa model, it 
is assumed that the consumer goods sector is composed of two firms and characterized by Cournot 
competition. In our model, all input factors are supplied competitively. The duopoly’s product is solely 
consumed by consumers. The final goods sector and duopolists use capital and labor as inputs to 
produce final goods and duopoly’s products. In perfect markets (homogenous), firms have zero profit, 
while a duopoly might have positive profits. This study assumes that the homogeneous population 
shares profits equally. There is no free entry in a duopoly market. In addition, the final good is 
expressed in numeraire, which serves as a medium of exchange. It is assumed that capital depreciates 
at a fixed depreciation rate of  k . 
 
Production of final products 
 
Let 𝐹𝑖(𝑡), 𝐾𝑖(𝑡), and 𝑁𝑖(𝑡) stand for output, capital input, and labor inputs of the final goods sector, 
respectively. The production function of the final goods sector is specified as follows (1): 
 
𝐹𝑖(𝑡)  =  𝐴𝑖 𝐾𝑖
𝛼𝑖(𝑡) 𝑁𝑖
𝛽𝑖(𝑡), 0 <  𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖, 𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽𝑖 =  1   (1) 
 
where 𝐴𝑖, 𝛼𝑖, and 𝛽𝑖  are parameters. We use 𝑤(𝑡) and 𝑟(𝑡) to denote the wage and interest rates, 
respectively. The input prices are equal for all the producers due to perfect competition in input 
factors markets. The profit of the final goods sector is 
  
      𝜋𝑖(𝑡)  =  𝐹𝑖(𝑡)  − (𝑟(𝑡) + 𝛿𝑘) 𝐾𝑖(𝑡)  −  𝑤(𝑡) 𝑁𝑖(𝑡) 
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The marginal conditions imply (2): 
 
                                 𝑟𝛿(𝑡)  =  
𝛼𝑖 𝐹𝑖(𝑡)
𝐾𝑖(𝑡)
, 𝑤(𝑡)  =  
𝛽𝑖 𝐹𝑖(𝑡)
𝑁𝑖(𝑡)




𝑟𝛿(𝑡) ≡ 𝑟(𝑡) + 𝛿𝑘 
 
    
Consumer behaviors and wealth dynamics 
 
This study applies the approach to modeling household behavior proposed by Zhang (1993, 2005). 
We use ?̄?(𝑡) to denote wealth per household. In addition, we have ?̄?(𝑡) = 𝐾(𝑡)/?̅?, where 𝐾(𝑡) is 
the total capital. It is assumed that profits, due to the duopoly, are equally shared among the 
population. Note that profits, in the literature of industrial economics, are often assumed to be 
invested in innovation. Conceptually, it is not difficult to make profit distribution more realistic by 
including endogenous technologies. Here, we use ℎ to represent human capital and 𝜋𝑗(𝑡) to denote 
duopolist 𝑗′𝑠 profit. The current income of the representative household is obtained as follows (3): 
 
      𝑦(𝑡)  =  𝑟(𝑡) ?̄?(𝑡)  +  ℎ 𝑤(𝑡)  +  
𝜋1(𝑡)+ 𝜋2(𝑡)
?̄?
    (3) 
 
The household’s disposable income, i.e., ?̂?(𝑡), equals the current disposable income and the value of 
wealth as follows (4): 
 
      ?̂?(𝑡)  =  𝑦(𝑡)  + ?̄?(𝑡)  =  R̃(𝑡)  + 
𝜋1(𝑡) + 𝜋2(𝑡)
?̄?




R̃(𝑡)  ≡  𝑅(𝑡) ?̄?(𝑡)  +  ℎ 𝑤(𝑡), R(𝑡)  ≡ 1 +  𝑟(𝑡) 
 
The representative household distributes the total available budget among the consumption of the 
duopoly’s product 𝑐𝑠(𝑡), the consumption of final goods 𝑐𝑖(𝑡), and savings 𝑠(𝑡). The budget 
constraint is (5): 
  
𝑝(𝑡) 𝑐𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑖(𝑡) +  𝑠(𝑡)  =  ?̂?(𝑡)      (5) 
 
where 𝑝(𝑡) is the price of the duopoly’s product. It is assumed that the 𝑈(𝑡) utility level is related to 








where 𝜆0 denotes the propensity to save. We solve the optimal problem (6): 
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𝑝(𝑡) 𝑐𝑠(𝑡)  =  𝜂 ?̂?(𝑡), 𝑐𝑖(𝑡)  =  𝜉 ?̂?(𝑡), 𝑠(𝑡) =  𝜆 ?̂?(𝑡)     (6) 
 
where 
𝜂 ≡  𝜂0 𝜌, 𝜉 ≡  𝜉0 𝜌, 𝜆 ≡  𝜆0 𝜌, 𝜌 ≡  
1
𝜂0 +  𝜉0 + 𝜆0
 
 
There is a proportional relationship between the disposable income and the total value of the 
variable. This simple relationship is due to the presumed utility functional form. We conclude that, 




According to the definition of 𝑠(𝑡), the change in the representative household’s wealth is calculated 
as follows (7): 
  
?̇̄?(𝑡) = 𝑠(𝑡) − ?̄?(𝑡) = 𝜆 ?̂?(𝑡)  − ?̄?(𝑡)      (7) 
 
According to this equation, the change in wealth equals saving minus dissaving.  
 
Equilibrium for the duopoly’s product  
 
We denote the output of duopolist 𝑗 using 𝐹𝑗(𝑡). The equilibrium condition for the duopoly’s product 
is (8): 
 




Duopolies are characterized by Cournot competition. Companies in the consumer goods industry 
compete over the amount of output they will supply. Each firm decides independently of other firms 
at the same time. They do not cooperate and compete in quantities. They choose quantities 
simultaneously. There is no product differentiation between the firms. Firms have market power as 
each firm’s output decision influences the price of the duopoly’s goods. They behave economically 
rationally, and each firm designs its strategies with the aim of maximizing profit given the other firm’s 
decisions on quantities.  
 
From (8) and (6), the demand function for the duopoly’s product is given by (9): 
 
     𝑝(𝑡) =  
𝜂 ?̂?(𝑡) ?̅?
𝐹𝑑(𝑡)
                     (9) 
    
where 𝐹𝑑(𝑡)  ≡  𝐹1(𝑡) + 𝐹2(𝑡). We use 𝐾𝑗(𝑡) and 𝑁𝑗(𝑡) to represent duopolist 𝑗’s capital input and 
labor input, respectively. The production functions of the duopoly are taken on the following form 
(10): 
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    𝐹𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑗  𝐾𝑗
𝛼𝑗(𝑡) 𝑁
𝑗
𝛽𝑗(𝑡), 𝛼𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗  >  0, 𝛼𝑗  +  𝛽𝑗  =  1   (10) 
 
where 𝐴𝑗, 𝛼𝑗 , and 𝛽𝑗 are parameters. The profit of duopolist 𝑗 is given by (11): 
 
     𝜋𝑗(𝑡) =  𝑝(𝑡) 𝐹𝑗(𝑡)  − 𝑟𝛿(𝑡) 𝐾𝑗(𝑡)  −  𝑤(𝑡) 𝑁𝑗(𝑡)                (11) 
 
Inserting (9) in (11), we get (12): 
 
𝜋𝑗(𝑡) =  
𝜂 ?̅? 𝐹𝑗(𝑡) R̃(𝑡)
𝐹𝑑(𝑡)
 +  
𝜂 𝐹𝑗(𝑡) (𝜋1(𝑡)+ 𝜋2(𝑡))
𝐹𝑑(𝑡)
 − 𝑟𝛿(𝑡) 𝐾𝑗(𝑡)  −  𝑤(𝑡) 𝑁𝑗(𝑡)           (12) 
 
Adding the two equations in (12) yields (13): 
 




𝐾𝑑(𝑡)  ≡  𝐾1(𝑡) +  𝐾2(𝑡), 𝑁𝑑(𝑡)  ≡  𝑁1(𝑡) + 𝑁2(𝑡) 
 
Inserting (13) in (12), we obtain (14): 
 
𝜋𝑗(𝑡) =  
𝜂 𝐹𝑗(𝑡) (?̅? R̃(𝑡) −𝑟𝛿(𝑡) 𝐾𝑑(𝑡) − 𝑤(𝑡) 𝑁𝑑(𝑡))
(1− 𝜂) 𝐹𝑑(𝑡)
 −  𝑟𝛿(𝑡) 𝐾𝑗(𝑡)  −  𝑤(𝑡) 𝑁𝑗(𝑡)          (14) 
 
Each duopolist maximizes its profit given the other duopolist’s output (and input factors). The 





𝜂 𝛼𝑗  𝐹𝑗 𝐹𝑚 (?̅? R̃  − 𝑟𝛿  𝐾𝑑  −  𝑤 𝑁𝑑)




(1 −  𝜂) 𝐹𝑑
 +  1) 𝑟𝛿 = 0 




𝜂 𝛽𝑗 𝐹𝑗 𝐹𝑚 (?̅? R̃ −𝑟𝛿 𝐾𝑑 − 𝑤 𝑁𝑑)
(1− 𝜂) 𝐹𝑑
2 𝑁𝑗
 −  (
𝜂 𝐹𝑗
(1− 𝜂) 𝐹𝑑
 +  1)  𝑤 = 0               (15) 
 
According to (15), each duopolist decides on the labor and capital inputs as functions of the wage 
rate, interest rate, wealth, and the other duopolist’s output and input factors. Each duopolist’s output 
and profit are determined by (10) and (14), respectively. The price of the duopoly’s product is given 
by (9).  
 
Demand and supply of final goods 
 
The change in capital stock equals the output of the final goods sector minus the depreciation of the 
capital stock and total consumption. The physical capital accumulation equation is given as follows 
(16): 
    ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝐹𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) − 𝛿𝑘𝐾(𝑡)                (16) 
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where  
 
𝐶𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑐𝑖(𝑡) ?̄? 
 
Labor and capital being fully utilized 
 
In an equilibrium of the labor market, we have (17): 
 
  𝑁𝑖(𝑡)  + 𝑁1(𝑡) + 𝑁2(𝑡)  =  ℎ ?̄?                           (17) 
 
For capital markets, we have (18): 
 
                𝐾𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐾1(𝑡)  + 𝐾2(𝑡)  =  ?̅?(𝑡) ?̄?                 (18) 
 
We have thus constructed the model proposed here, which is founded on the Solow-Uzawa model 
(Solow, 1956; Uzawa, 1961), Cournot-Nash equilibrium model (Nikaido, 1975), and Zhang’s concept 
of disposable income and utility function (Zhang, 2020). The rest of this paper examines the 





In the previous section, we constructed the growth model of wealth accumulation with perfect 
competition and Cournot game. The following lemma presents a computational program to follow 
the movement of the economic system. We thus introduce a variable: 
 
𝑧(𝑡)  ≡  






The dynamics of the economic system are described by the following differential equation (19):  
 
    ?̇?(𝑡)  =  ?̅?(𝑧(𝑡))                              (19) 
  
where ?̅?(𝑧(𝑡)) is the function of 𝑧(𝑡) defined in the Appendix. All the other variables are explicitly 
given as functions of 𝑧(𝑡), as follows: k̅(𝑡) by (A15) → 𝐾(𝑡) = ?̄?(𝑡) ?̄? → 𝑟(𝑡) by (A2) → 𝑤(𝑡) by (A3) 
→ 𝐾2(𝑡) by (A12) → 𝐾1(𝑡) by (A10) → 𝐾𝑖(𝑡) by (A11) → 𝑁1(𝑡), 𝑁2(𝑡) and 𝑁𝑖(𝑡) by (A1) → 𝐹𝑖(𝑡) and 
𝐹𝑗(𝑡) by (A4) → ?̃?(𝑡) by (4) → 𝜋𝑗(𝑡) by (14) → ?̂?(𝑡) by (4) → 𝑝(𝑡) by (9) → 𝑐𝑖(𝑡), 𝑐𝑠(𝑡) and 𝑠(𝑡) by 
(7) → 𝑈(𝑡) by the definition. 
 
To simulate the model, we specified the values of the parameters as follows (20): 
 
?̅? = 50, ℎ = 2, 𝐴𝑖  =  1, 𝐴1 =  1.5, 𝐴2 = 1.3, 𝛼𝑖 = 0.33, 𝛼1 = 0.36, 𝛼2 =  0.35, 
       𝜆0  =  0.8, 𝜉0 =  0.2, 𝜂0 = 0.6, 𝛿𝑘 = 0.05                 (20) 
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The population is 50, and the human capital is 2. The selected values of the parameters do not refer 
to a real-life economy. We gain insight into the economic mechanism of growth by simulating the 
effects of different values of these parameters on the national economy. We defined the following 
initial condition: 𝑧(0)  =  0.102. The movement is given by Figure 1, where the growth rate is defined 
by (21): 
 
      𝑔(𝑡)  ≡  
?̇?(𝑡) 
𝑌(𝑡)









Figure 1. Movement of the economic system 
Figura 1. Movimiento del sistema económico 
Source: Created by the author. 
 
From the initial state, the national output falls. The growth rate is negative and is zero in equilibrium. 
The profits of duopolists fall. The three levels of output of the sectors change slightly. The profit of 
the duopoly’s product increases, and the interest rate rises. The wage rate falls. The representative 
household has a lower income, consumes less, and has a lower utility. The simulation demonstrates 
that the system becomes stationary in the long term. The simulation gives the equilibrium point as 
follows: 
  
𝑌 = 196.9, 𝐾 =  463.2, 𝐹𝑖 = 139, 𝐹1 = 20.6, 𝐹2 = 18.5, 𝑁𝑖 = 84.3, 𝑁1 = 7.7 
𝑁2 = 8.1, 𝐾𝑖 =  383.4,  𝐾1 = 39.5,  𝐾2 = 40.2, 𝜋1 = 17.4, 𝜋2 = 13.6, 𝑟 = 0.07 
𝑤 = 1.11, 𝑝 = 1.48, ?̂? = 12.7, ?̄? = 9.3,  𝑐𝑖 =  2.32, 𝑐𝑠 = 0.78, 𝑈 =  6.85 
 
The eigenvalue at the point of equilibrium is −0.183. This implies that the point of equilibrium is 
locally stable and that the dynamic comparative analysis is effective in the transitory process as well 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In the previous section, we demonstrated the movement of the national economy with perfectly 
competitive and duopoly product markets. This section examines how the national economic 
movement is affected when some exogenous conditions, such as households’ preference and 
technologies, experience exogeneous changes. Following the computational procedure to calibrate 
the model in the lemma, we describe the effects of changes in any parameter on the movement of 
the economic system. Let us define a variable ?̄?𝑥 to denote the change rate of the 𝑥 variable in 
percentage due to changes in the parameter value. 
 
Duopolist 1’s total factor productivity is enhanced 
 
We first examine how the national economy changes its path of development when one duopolist’s 
total factor productivity is enhanced as follows: ?̄?𝐴1  =  3.3. The effects of this modification on the 
variables are plotted in Figure 2. The output of duopolist 1 is increased. Duopolist 1 employs less 
labor and capital inputs. Duopolist 2 produces less and employs less labor and capital inputs. 
Duopolist 1 gets more profit, while duopolist 2 gets less of it. The final goods sector produces more 
and employs more labor and capital inputs. The growth rate is enhanced. The national output is 
augmented. The interest rate falls. The wage rate rises. The price of the duopoly’s product is reduced. 
The representative household has more wealth and disposable income. The utility is enhanced. The 




Figure 2. Duopolist 1’s total factor productivity is enhanced 
Figura 2. La productividad total de los factores del duopolista 1 mejora 
Source: Created by the author. 
 
The propensity to consume the duopoly’s product is augmented  
 
We now study how the national economy is affected when the propensity to consume the duopoly’s 
product is augmented as follows: ?̄?η0  =  10. The effects on the variables are plotted in Figure 3. The 
output levels of the two duopolists are increased. Each duopolist employs more labor and capital 
inputs. Their profits are enhanced. The final goods sector produces less and employs less labor and 
capital inputs. The growth rate is reduced. The national output is augmented. The interest rate rises, 
and the wage rate falls. The price of the duopoly’s product is enhanced. The utility is enhanced initially 
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but reduced in the long term. The household has less wealth and disposable income. The household 




Figure 3. The propensity to consume the duopoly’s product is augmented 
Figura 3. Se aumenta la propensión a consumir el producto del duopolio 
Source: Created by the author. 
 
The propensity to save is augmented  
 
We now study how the movement of the national economy changes when the propensity to save is 
enhanced as follows: ?̄?λ0  =  1.15. The effects on the variables are plotted in Figure 4. The national 
physical capital is increased. The national output falls initially but rises in the long term. The output 
levels of the two duopolists are reduced initially but increased in the long term. Each duopolist 
employs less capital input initially but more of it in the long term. Each duopolist employs less labor 
input. Their profits are reduced initially but enhanced in the long term. The final goods sector 
produces more and employs more labor and capital inputs. The growth rate is enhanced. The interest 
rate falls, and the wage rate rises. The price of the duopoly’s product is reduced. The utility is 
enhanced. The household has more wealth and disposable income. The household consumes fewer 




Figure 4. The propensity to save is augmented 
Figura 4. La propensión a ahorrar aumenta 
Source: Created by the author. 
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The final goods sector’s total factor productivity is enhanced  
 
We now study how the national economy is affected when the propensity to consume the duopoly’s 
product is augmented as follows: ?̄?A𝑖  =  5. The effects on the variables are plotted in Figure 5. The 
final goods sector produces more and employs more capital input. The sector employs more labor 
force initially but does not change labor input in the long term. The output levels of the two duopolists 
are reduced initially but increased in the long term. Each duopolist employs less capital input initially 
but more of it in the long term. It employs less labor input initially but it does not change in the long 
term. Their profits are enhanced. The growth rate is augmented. The national output is augmented. 
The interest rate rises initially but does not change in the long term. The wage rate rises. The price of 
the duopoly’s product is enhanced. The household has more wealth and disposable income. The 
utility is enhanced. The household consumes more final goods. The household consumes less 
duopoly’s product initially but more of it in the long term. 
 
 
Figure 5. The final goods sector’s total factor productivity is enhanced 
Figura 5. La productividad total de los factores del sector de bienes finales mejora 
Source: Created by the author. 
 
Duopolist 1’s output elasticity of capital input is augmented  
 
We now analyze how the national economy is affected when duopolist 1’s output elasticity of capital 
input is augmented as follows: ?̄?α1  =  10. The effects on the variables are plotted in Figure 6. The 
national capital stock and national output rise initially and do not change in the long term. The output 
level of duopolist 1 is enhanced. Duopolist 1 produces and employs more capital input and less labor 
input. Duopolist 2 produces more initially but produces the same amount in the long term. It employs 
more capital input initially and less of it in the long term. It uses more labor input. Duopolist 1 has 
more profit, while duopolist 2 has less profit. The final goods sector produces more initially and 
almost the same amount in the long term. Said sector uses more labor input. It employs more capital 
input initially and less of it in the long term. The interest rate rises, and the wage rate falls. The price 
of the duopoly’s product is reduced. The utility is enhanced initially but changed slightly in the long 
term. The household has more wealth and disposable income initially but almost the same amount 
in the long term. The household consumes more final goods initially but almost the same number in 
the long term. The household consumes more duopoly’s product. 
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Figure 6. Duopolist 1’s output elasticity of capital input is increased 
Figura 6. La elasticidad de salida de la entrada de capital del duopolista 1 se incrementa 
Source: Created by the author. 
 
Comparison with perfect competition 
 
This section compares the dynamics of the model proposed with Cournot competition and the two-
sector model with perfect competition. When the system is perfectly competitive, firms take the price 
as given, and the equilibrium condition of demand and supply determines the price. We here describe 
the growth model when the consumer goods market is perfectly competitive. One of the main 
differences is that the profit is zero in perfect competition, i.e., 𝜋𝑗(𝑡) = 0. The profits and marginal 
conditions for the two firms are the following, respectively: 
 




 𝛼𝑗 𝑝(𝑡) 𝐹𝑗(𝑡) 
𝐾𝑗(𝑡)




𝛽𝑗  𝑝(𝑡) 𝐹𝑗(𝑡) 
 𝑁𝑗(𝑡)
 −  𝑤(𝑡)  =  0. (15)′ 
 
where Equations (11)’ and (15)’ correspond to (11) and (15), respectively. The rest of the equations 
in Section 2, except those related to the duopoly’s profits and marginal conditions, hold as well for 
the perfectly competitive case. In Appendix A-2, we present a computational program to plot the 
movement of the competitive model. We plot the movement of the two systems under the same 
parameter values in (20). The result is plotted in Figure 7. In the latter, we do not plot profits as no 
firm achieves a positive profit in the perfectly competitive economy. In our model, firm 2 produces 
nothing in the case of the perfectly competitive economy. Hence, firm 1’s behavior represents the 
sector’s behavior. From the figure, we conclude that, in the Cournot competition, the national output 
and national capital (and thus household wealth) are higher than in the perfectly competitive 
economy. In the Cournot competition, the final goods sector produces more and employs more labor 
and capital inputs, while the consumer goods sector produces less and employs less labor and capital 
inputs. The interest rate is lower, the wage rate is higher, and the price of consumer goods is higher. 
The household has more disposable income, consumes more final goods, consumes fewer consumer 
goods, and has a higher level of utility. We see that, if the profits of the duopoly are equally distributed 
among the households, the welfare of the latter is higher welfare when the consumer goods market 
is characterized by Cournot competition rather than perfect competition. 
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Figure 7. Comparing the movement of the two economic systems 
Figura 7. Comparación del movimiento de los dos sistemas económicos 
Note: Solid lines represent the Cournot competition, and dashed lines denote perfect competition 





This study made a unique contribution to economic growth theory by integrating an important model 
of industry structure with imperfect competition in microeconomic theory with neoclassical growth 
theory. The proposed model shows a way to integrate neoclassical economic growth theory with 
modern microeconomics. We introduced Cournot competition into the Solow-Uzawa neoclassical 
growth model with Zhang’s concept of disposable income and utility function. The model is founded 
on some well-known economic theories in economic literature. The economy analyzed here is 
composed of final goods and consumer goods sectors. We constructed the model within the 
framework of the Solow-Uzawa two-sector growth model. The final goods sector is the same as that 
in the Solow model, in which all markets are perfectly competitive. We followed the Uzawa’s two-
sector model of economic growth but assumed that the consumer goods sector in the Uzawa model 
is composed of two firms and characterized by Cournot competition. The modelling of the Cournot 
competition was based on game theory found in microeconomic literature. In our model, all the input 
factors are competitive. The duopoly’s product is solely consumed by consumers. The final goods 
sector and duopolists use capital and labor as inputs to produce final goods and duopoly’s products. 
In perfect markets (homogenous), firms have zero profit, while duopolists might have positive profits. 
We modelled household behavior with Zhang’s concept of disposable income and utility function. 
This modelling strategy enabled us to derive the demand function. The model endogenously 
determines the profits of the duopoly. In this study, the profits are equally distributed among the 
population. We built the dynamic model and then found a computational procedure to follow the 
movement of the economy. We conducted comparative dynamic analyses of some parameters. We 
also compared the performances of the economies with Cournot competition and perfect 
competition. We provided some insight into the role of imperfect competition in long-term growth 
by comparing the long-term growth of the imperfect and perfect competition. It was demonstrated 
that, in the Cournot competition, the national output and national capital (and thus household 
wealth) are higher than in the perfectly competitive economy. In the Cournot competition, the final 
goods sector produces more and employs more labor and capital inputs, while the consumer goods 
sector produces less and employs less labor and capital inputs. The interest rate is lower, the wage 
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rate is higher, and price of consumer goods is higher. The representative household has more 
disposable income, consumes more final goods, consumes fewer consumer goods, and has a higher 
level of utility. We can see that. if the profits of the duopoly are equally distributed to the households, 
the welfare of the latter is welfare when the consumer goods market is characterized by Cournot 
competition rather than perfect competition. As this is an initial integration of different theories and 
each theory has its own vast literature, we can extend and generalize our model based on such 
literature. The model can be generalized in a straightforward manner by examining multiple firms in 
the consumer goods industry with Cournot competition. We can also introduce other imperfect 
competition and different games into the analytical framework developed in this study (Dixit & 
Stiglitz, 1977; Wang, 2012; Zhang, 2020). 
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APPENDIX A-1: Proving the lemma 
 
 
From (2) and (15), we get 
𝑧 ≡  
𝑟+𝛿𝑘
𝑤
 =  
?̄?𝑖𝑁𝑖
𝐾𝑖
 =  
?̄?𝑗 𝑁𝑗
𝐾𝑗
                    (A1) 
 
where ?̄?𝑥 ≡ 𝛼𝑥/𝛽𝑥. By (2) we have  
 





− 𝛿𝑘                                          (A2) 
 
From (A1), we have 
 𝑤 =  
𝑟+𝛿𝑘
𝑧
                     (A3) 
 
With (1), (10), and (A1), we get 
 





                 (A4) 
 
From (A1), we have 
 
      𝐾𝑥  =  
?̄?𝑥 𝑁𝑥
𝑧
                          (A5) 
 
By (15) we have 
 






 +  1) 𝑟𝛿                   (A6) 
 
By (A6) we have  
 




𝐹1+ (1− 𝜂) 𝐹2
𝐹2+ (1− 𝜂) 𝐹1
                               (A7) 
 
Inserting (A5) in (A7), yields 
 
    𝑔2 + (
𝑓2 − 𝛼 (1− 𝜂) 𝑓1
𝑓1
)  𝑔 −  
𝛼 𝑓2
𝑓1
= 0                              (A8) 
 
where 𝑔 ≡ 𝐾1/𝐾2 and 𝛼 ≡ 𝛼1/𝛼2. The solution of (A8) is given by 
 
   𝑔(𝑧)  =  − (
𝑓2 −𝛼 (1 − 𝜂) 𝑓1
2 𝑓1
) + ((
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We thus have 
𝐾1  =  𝑔 𝐾2                 (A10) 
 
Inserting (A1) in (17), we obtain 
 
            𝐾𝑖  +  (
?̄?𝑖 𝑔
?̄?1
 +  
?̄?𝑖
?̄?2
) 𝐾2  =  
?̄?𝑖 ℎ ?̄?
𝑧
               (A11) 
 
Inserting (A11) and (A10) in (18), we get 
    




?̅?(𝑧)  ≡  ?̄?  (1 +  𝑔 − 
?̄?𝑖  𝑔
?̄?1





, 𝑔0(𝑧)  ≡  




From (15), we have 
 
           
𝜂 𝛼2 𝐹2 𝐹1 (?̅? R̃ −𝑟𝛿 (𝐾1+ 𝐾2) − 𝑤 (𝑁1+ 𝑁2))
(1− 𝜂) (𝐹1 + 𝐹2)2 𝐾2
 =  (
𝜂 𝐹2 
(1− 𝜂) (𝐹1 + 𝐹2)
 +  1) 𝑟𝛿             (A13) 
 
Inserting (A1), (A4) and (10) in (A13), we obtain  
 
      
?̅? R̃ − 𝑔0 𝐾2
 𝐾2




?̂?(𝑧)  ≡  (
𝜂 𝑓2 
(1 −  𝜂) (𝑓1𝑔 +  𝑓2)
 +  1)
(1 −  𝜂) (𝑓1𝑔 + 𝑓2)
2 𝑟𝛿
𝜂 𝛼2 𝑓1 𝑓2𝑔
 
𝑔1(𝑧)  ≡  (1 +  𝑔) 𝑟𝛿 +  𝑤 𝑧 (
1
?̄?1






Inserting (A12) and the definition of R̃ in (A14), we get 
 
?̄? =  𝜑(𝑧)  ≡  
(𝑔1+ ?̂?) 𝑔0 + ?̅? ℎ 𝑤
(𝑔1+ ?̂?) ?̅? − 𝑅 ?̅?
                (A15) 
 
It is straightforward to confirm that all the variables can be expressed as functions of 𝑧 by the 
following procedure: k̅ by (A15) → 𝐾 = ?̄??̄? → 𝑟 by (A2) → 𝑤 by (A3) → 𝐾2 by (A12) → 𝐾1 by 
(A10) → 𝐾𝑖  by (A11) → 𝑁1, 𝑁2 and 𝑁𝑖  by (A1) → 𝐹𝑖 and 𝐹𝑗 by (A4) → ?̃? by (4) → 𝜋𝑗 by (14) → 
?̂? by (4) → 𝑝 by (9) → 𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑗 and 𝑠 by (7) → 𝑈 by the definition. From this procedure and (8), 
we have 
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                       ?̇̄?  =  𝑓(𝑧)  ≡  𝑠(𝑧)  −  𝜑(𝑧)    (A16) 
 
Deriving k̅ =  𝜑(𝑧) in time, yields  
          ?̇̄?  =  
𝑑 𝜑
𝑑 𝑧
 ?̇?         (A17) 
 
From (A16) and (A17), we have 
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APPENDIX A-2: A computational procedure to simulate the perfectly competitive model 
 
 
We still have (A1)–(A5). By (15)’ we have  
 






) 𝑟𝛿                          (A19) 
 
Inserting (A19) in (9), we get 
 
    𝐾1  =  
𝛼1 𝜂 ?̅? 𝑅 ?̄?
𝑟𝛿
 +





                 (A20) 
 
Inserting (A20) in (18), we obtain 
 
   𝐾𝑖  =  (𝑁 ̄ − 
𝛼1 𝜂 ?̅? 𝑅
𝑟𝛿
) ?̄? +  (
𝛼1
𝛼2
−  1) 𝐾2 −
𝛼1 ℎ 𝜂 ?̅? 𝑤
𝑟𝛿
      (A21) 
 
Inserting (A1) in (17), yields 
 
           𝐾𝑖  +  
?̄?𝑖 𝐾1
?̄?1
 +  
?̄?𝑖 𝐾2
?̄?2
 =  
?̄?𝑖 ℎ ?̄?
𝑧
                (A22) 
 
From (A21) and (A22), we get 
 




𝛼1 ℎ 𝜂 ?̅? 𝑤
𝑟𝛿
 =  (𝑁 ̄ − 
𝛼1 𝜂 ?̅? 𝑅
𝑟𝛿
) ?̄? +  (
𝛼1
𝛼2
 +  
?̄?𝑖
?̄?2
 −  1) 𝐾2  +  
?̄?𝑖 𝐾1
?̄?1
            (A23) 
 
By (15)’ and (A4) we have 
 








                (A24) 
 
By (9) and (A4) we have 
 
        𝑓1 𝐾1 + 𝑓2 𝐾2  =  
(𝑅 ?̄? + ℎ 𝑤) 𝜂 ?̅?
𝑝
                (A25) 
 
From (A25), (A21), and (A20), we have  
 
?̄? =  ?̅?(𝑧)                 (A26) 
 
Like the procedure for the lemma, we determined all the variables as functions of 𝑧 by the following 
procedure: k̅ by (A26) → 𝐾 = ?̄??̄? → 𝑟 by (A2) → 𝑤 by (A3) → 𝑝 by (A24) → 𝐾1 and 𝐾2 by (A20) and 
(A25) → 𝐾𝑖  by (A21) → 𝑁1, 𝑁2  and 𝑁𝑖  by (A1) → 𝐹𝑖 and 𝐹𝑗 by (A4) →?̂? by (4) → 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑗 and 𝑠 by (7) → 
𝑈 by the definition. Like (A16)–(A18), we thus have the equation that determines the movement of 
𝑧. 
